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Reviews
The UN Declaration on Friendly Relations and the System of the
Sources of InternationalLaw. By Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz. Alphen
aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979. Pp.
xiii, 341. Price: $27.50 (paper)
The United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations was adopted as a
Resolution of the General Assembly in 1970. Since then, most of
the countries in the Third World, actively supported by the Soviet
Union and its allies in eastern Europe, have tended to give this
document an authority that is akin to that of the Sermon on the
Mount. At the same time they, as well as a number of lawyers in the
western world, have increasingly argued that resolutions of the
United Nations constitute a 'source' of international law, so that,
regardless of whether the substance of any such resolution conforms
to or contradicts accepted rules of law, its contents are to be treated
as law binding even upon states which did not vote in its favour.
Professor Arangio-Ruiz of the University of Rome delivered a
course of lectures at the Hague Academy in 1972 in which he
outlined his views on the relationship between the Declaration and
the 'sources' of international law. He has now elaborated this course
into a monograph entitled The UN Declaration on Friendly
Relations and the System of the Sources of InternationalLaw.
It is generally accepted among international lawyers that certainly
those resolutions of the Assembly which may be considered as
'housekeeping' in character are of binding force. The learned author
agrees, but he suggests that not all such resolutions are in fact
interna corporis, putting forward as an example a budgetary
decision under Article 17 "which determines the quantum of the
member states' obligation to pay contributions, [and] creates, or at
least 'quantifies', obligations of member States" (p. 14). It may be
suggested, however, that this is merely to state the same thing twice.
More generally, he agrees that the Charter and the travaux
priparatoiresclearly give the Assembly no legislative authority in
so far as its powers in the political field are concerned (pp. 15 et
seq.). He points out that "the merely hortatory effect of Assembly
declarations has been clearly confirmed by practice" (p. 18), and
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that this has been affirmed by the Office of Legal Affairs, which
will go no further than to say that a Declaration as distinct from any
other resolution may only "be expected to impart . . . a strong

expectation that Members of the international community will abide
by it" (p. 19, italics in text). However, he tends to the view that
constant repetition by the Assembly "would represent adequate
evidence of the existence of a corresponding customary rule" (p.
23). But surely this is only true if the states which have paid
lip-service to the so-called rule by their votes are also willing to
accept the rule in practice by complying with it.
Indeed, the author himself appears to concede this (p. 25),
although he states that:
Compliance or non-compliance with the allegedly law-making
acts is directly not more decisive, however relevant, than the
actual compliance or non-compliance with treaties... may be
decisive for the demonstration of the existence of pacta sunt
servanda (p. 26, italics in original).
But this is to ignore the fact that there is no dispute that treaties are
in fact law-making and legally binding and thatpactasunt servanda
is one of the oldest recognized principles of international law.
Disregard of a treaty, therefore, is ipso facto a breach of
international law. What is at issue in connection with General
Assembly Resolutions is the very question of their legal force.
Idealists may well agree with the author's contention that "it is
hardly conceivable that a text enacted by an international organ
operating under a treaty and concerning the relations of States inter
se or with other entities, or in any other way the conduct of States at
home or abroad could be without value for, or from the point of
view of, international law" (p. 39). Prima facie this sounds
eminently reasonable, but it is submitted that it completely ignores
the ideological function that the United Nations and its 'motherhood' resolutions possess for so many of the Members.
As regards customary law, there is probably no dispute as to the
suggestion that Assembly recommendations, since they are only
part of State practice at large (p. 46)
...

only provide material custom-making

stuff ...

The

resolution in its material essence is really the text as one element
in a congeries offacts connected with, or related to, the adoption
of the resolution and including such adoption (pp. 42-43, italics
in original).
Therefore, constant reiteration of a principle in a series of
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resolutions - what the author calls the "shouting out" of rules achieves little:
• ..for the shouted rule to be customary law there still remains to
consider the conduct and the attitudes of States with regard to the
actual behaviour, positive or negative, contemplated as due by
the rule (p. 46).
As a result "the tendency of the United Nations Assembly to
"legiferate' by resolution or declaratory resolution has no merit in a
consensus versus consent development in the formation of the
customary rules to which Assembly resolutions may contribute" (p.
52), and it makes no difference even if the resolution in question is
unanimous. And, states the author, what is true of the relation of
declaratory resolutions to custom is equally true of their relation to
international agreements (p. 56), with each resolution purporting to
interpret an agreement judged on its own merits (p. 62).
It is for this reason that there is little difficulty in accepting the
power of the Assembly to indulge in authentic interpretations of the
Charter as such (p. 82), but, as distinct from the Charter, "there
will be no more legal value in the interpreting resolution than there
was in the interpreted resolution" (p. 83), so that reiteration and
soidisantinterpretation cannot give binding force to any resolution and
or declaration which lacked it in the first instance. To the extent that
any resolution merely records or reiterates principles already in the
Charter there is no problem, but where any innovations are
concerned, their legal effect depends on inter-State agreement or
custom (p. 86). This is, of course, particularly true of any
Declaration that has come through the medium of the International
Law Commission, which was not the case with the Friendly
Relations Declaration for this was intended to be political in
purpose, discussion and adoption. It is, in fact, "an instrument of a
purely hortatory value" (p. 93). In so far as the principles embodied
therein are already principles of international law or are paraphrases
of obligations in the Charter, the Declaration has no effect
whatever. This fact, however, does not mean that innovations
possess the same status. They, at most, constitute lexferenda (p.
93).
The learned author draws attention to the drafting history of the
Declaration to remind us that it was to a great extent the product of
attempts to harmonize the views of East and West and of the
developed and the developing nations. In other words, in his view
its purpose was the "co-ordination of international legal systems"
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(p. 148), although he does not concede that there can be separate
international legal systems, for it is of the essence that international
law should be universal in character (p. 153). It much be borne in
mind, however, that there can be regional deviations setting up rules
which are binding among the members, as there can be bilateral
international law, and this he recognizes in his references to
ideological and similar groupings (pp. 154, 157, 169). The
ideological situation at the time was largely responsible for the
adoption of the principle of self-determination into international
law. As the author reminds us:
Decolonisation has been essentially the outcome of a historical
process seconded by a number of favourable circumstances,
ranging from local situations determined by events of the Second
World War to the policies of two great powers not involved in the
traditional forms of colonialism, and to the spontaneous
realisation, on the part of some of the interested governments,
that colonialism was obsolete. Decolonisation, in other words,
has been the result not of legal orpublic policies but of policies
tout court (p. 183, italics in original).
However, with the ratification of the two Human Rights Covenants,
both of which proclaim the right to self-determination in their
opening article, this right may now have acquired legal status.
As to the Friendly Relations Declaration and its significance,
Professor Arangio-Ruiz states that its "vagueness, scarcity of
progressive content and the lack of an adequate co-ordination
between conflicting or partly conflicting principles" do not
recommend it as a source of legal policies, contrary to what one
might have expected after the seven years of work which were
devoted to
... setting a landmark in the progressive development and
codification of international law. The declaration seems bound to
remain.

. .

little more than an object of recitation on the part of

the same organ from which it emanates, and a relatively organic
assembly of materials of lego-diplomatic jousting among States
within and without the United Nations (pp. 184-85).
As well as the healthy debunking of the Friendly Relations
Declaration demonstrated in this last statement and throughout his
book, Professor Arangio-Ruiz's The UN Declaration on Friendly
Relations and the System of the Sources of International Law
constitutes a most useful contribution to the jurisprudence of
international law, especially in relation to the status and significance
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of United Nations resolutions and the whole problem of the
'sources' of international law.
L. C. Green
University Professor
University of Alberta

The Principle of Sovereignty Over Natural Resources. By George
Elian. Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1979. Pp. xi, 238. Price: $42.50.
The publishing house of Sijthoff, now Sijthoff & Noordhoff, has
long had a reputation as one of the most important publishing
houses in the field of international law. Its recent series of
documentary volumes, often published in co-operation with Oceana
in New York, has provided international lawyers with a mass of raw
material they would otherwise have had difficulty in securing.
Occasionally, they have published in English works by scholars in
the Communist world which show how close their views are to
those of their colleagues elsewhere, regardless of issues of
ideology. One such issue, which has been elevated to a principle
of international law largely through the combined efforts of the
socialist and the newly independent countries, is that of sovereignty
over natural resources, which to some extent at least has played
havoc with old concepts regarding the non-expropriation of
foreign-held property (see ch. 5.1, pp. 141-54).
The Charter of the United Nations affirmed the principle of the
sovereign equality of all and introduced into international law the
concept of good neighbourliness as well as that of absolute
independence and self-administration. Also, in the Customs Union
case the Permanent Court of International Justice indicated that true
independence meant economic as well as political sovereignty. It is
therefore perhaps not surprising that this group of states found it
possible to argue that the Charter itself guarantees to each state
*..the prerogatives of complete sovereignty over the natural
riches and resources of its territory, which (once political
independence has been obtained) become national riches and
resources of the new State. It is only the nation concerned, by
itself and without any foreign interference, that has the
competence to decide about its future destination (p. 24).
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This view underlies all the United Nations measures relating to the
principle of sovereignty over natural resources and is the basis of
much of Dr. Elian's thought (p. 120, etc.).
Dr. Elian, formerly Rumanian Ambassador to the Netherlands, is
not only concerned with the General Assembly's resolution on this
matter, but illustrates how the activities of other organizations in the
field of freedom of commerce and coordination of supplies helped
to lay the foundation for the recognition of this principle. He gives
us the following reminder:
One of the practical uses of the United Nations, and one which is
worth emphasising, is that of bilateral contacts established at the
Organization's meetings. It is common knowledge [-it may be
among diplomats, but it is not quite so common among laymen-]
that extremely important diplomatic contacts take place in the
lobbies and halls of the Organization, particularly in New York.
Also well-known are numerous cases in which establishing or
resuming diplomatic relations between States has been initiated
and sometimes negotiated at the United Nations on the occasion
of General Assembly or other meetings (p. 84).
It has been reported, for example, that the first steps leading to the
rapprochement between Israel and Egypt were taken in this way.
While no one would deny that the General Assembly has played
some part in the development of international law, particularly
when it has been responsible for drafting conventions in regard to
"the establishment and development of the principles of modern
international law" (p. 84), sometimes with and sometimes without
the cooperation of the International Law Commission, it perhaps
goes too far to describe it as playing "the major part" in this
process. Moreover, there may be some dispute, especially on the
part of lawyers in the western world, as to the validity of his view
that the Friendly Relations Declaration is "one of the most
important of the documents" so elaborated,' and the same is true of
his estimation of the importance of some of the other documents to
which he refers (pp. 84-85).
Most western lawyers are still of the opinion that Declarations of
the General Assembly have no more binding authority than any
other Resolution, and this is the view taken by the Legal Division of
the Secretariat. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that these
manifestations of world opinion often play a part in setting
standards of international conduct and may well become sources of
1. See, for example, Gaetano Aranjio-Ruiz's comments in his book, The UN
Declarationon Friendly Relations and The System of the Sources of International
Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979)
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law if they are complied with in practice by members of the United
Nations. It is difficult, however, to accord such legal force even to
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States when it is
worded in such terms as "it is the duty of States to contribute to the
development of international trade of goods, particularly by means
of arrangements and by conclusion of long-term multi-lateral
commodity agreements, where appropriate and taking into account
the interests of producers and consumers" (Art. 6, c.p. 120). At
most this amounts to a pactum de contrahendo and its status is not
changed by stating that
. . .[f]rom the juridical point of view, all States are equal in their

relationships. As equal members of the international community
States are entitled to participate effectively in solving the world's
economic, financial and monetary problems . . [and] have an

obligation towards the growing liberalization of world trade (pp.
120-21).
And is anything gained from the legal point of view by such
statements as
What characterizes the Rumanian conception of the new order is
primarily the identification of profound injustice in economic
relations, as well as the necessity for inequality in these relations
to be removed through the engineering of a new international
economic order. Being incompatible with the maintenance of
current relations, the new order rejects the preservation on our
planet of relationships arising out of imperialistic, colonialistic or
non-colonialistic policies (p. 191)?
Behind the ideological 'mumbo-jumbo' there may well be reference
to a deepseated problem and recognition of the need to remedy it.
But the issue involved is political rather than legal, even though its
political settlement may require and produce a new legal
framework. In the achievement of this, however, it would be well to
avoid emotional value terms and to seek a basis for legal
development that avoids confusing legal and political issues, with
the implication that law is but the hand-maiden of politics, for if this
be the case the law will be ever-increasingly disregarded at the
demand of politics and, indeed, such disregard will appear to be
justified.
L. C. Green
University Professor
University of Alberta
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A Theory of CriminalJustice. By Hyman Gross. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979. Pp xviii, 521. Price: $20.95
Hyman Gross does not invent a conception of criminal justice. He
discovers it "in the principles that are generally aimed at by the
criminal law in every civilized society of a more or less liberal
democratic complexion" (p. xv). He discovers not a new world but
new vitality in an old one rooted in the jurisprudence of Bentham
and Austin. He offers a profound analysis of the principles of
criminal law and the theoretical framework which gives them
meaning. In so doing, he has made a distinguished contribution to
the re-examination of Anglo-American criminal justice.
Professor Gross begins with an inquiry into the purpose of
criminal justice, and he describes and criticizes three conceptions:
criminal justice as social criticism of an offender, which alone
makes sense of modern criminal law; criminal justice as moral
criticism of the offender - a conception which is not served and
should not be served by the criminal law; and criminal justice as a
means of removal and correction - a conception which is frustrated
by the criminal law.
The rules with respect to all crimes - common crimes such as
murder, rape and theft; crimes referable to conduct which is
generally thought to be wrong but not criminal unless the law says
so; and conduct which is not really thought to be wrong but which is
proscribed - make life in our society possible. Punishment for their
violation is necessary in order for the rules to be taken seriously.
This is the foundation of Professor Gross's theory of criminal
justice. He recognizes the overlap of criminal law and morality but
the justification of punishment lies not in the immorality of the
offender's act, but in the necessity of enforcing the rules. There is a
moral obligation to punish, but it is an imperative required by the
social contract between individual and state in which the individual
foregoes retaliation in return for the State's promise to protect him
from the harm which the rules prohibit. To the moralist who urges
that crime and immorality are coextensive, Professor Gross replies
that conduct may be culpable without being morally wrong and
morally wrong without being culpable. Dudley and Stephens,' and
the-fictional Speluncean Explorers 2 committed immoral acts but
1. (1884), 14Q.B.D. 273
2. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of The SpelunceanExplorers, (1949), 6 Harv. L. Rev.
6616
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they would not have been culpable on Gross's theory because "the
law must be designed to allow with impunity what ordinary men
must ordinarily do in the circumstances, even when the
extraordinary character of their circumstances requires them in
desperation to do what is morally reprehensible" (p. 292).
Morality is important as a basis for scrutiny and criticism of
criminal justice, but it is the concepts of responsibility and
culpability which are key in determining liability and administering
criminal justice. For the actor to be liable, he must be responsible
for conduct which is culpable, which he is if he violated the law
though he was able to do otherwise, and if his conduct is
intentional, harmful, dangerous and not justified by the interests
which prompt it. Intention is most important because it refers
exclusively to conduct as distinct from events and it is only conduct
which is capable of being criminal.
Professor Gross asserts that "an act posing a threat of harm must
be done intentionally if it is to be judged a culpable act; and the
extent of culpability depends upon the magnitude of the threat of
harm that exists because of what was done intentionally" (p. 83).
The magnitude of the threat of harm depends upon whether the
intentional illegitimate act was purposely directed to the harm,
whether the potential for harm was known to exist, whether the
actors were indifferent to the potential for harm, or whether the
actors did not take adequate precautions against the realization of the
potential for harm: purposefulness, knowledge, recklessness and
negligence. It depends also on the seriousness of the harm and
whether there is only a threat of harm or whether the threat or even
the harm itself is imminent.
Professor Gross criticizes orthodox theory which assesses
liability in terms of actus reus and mens rea. Because acts are not
simply bodily movements, the analysis of criminal liability in terms
of the coordination of bodily movements by a directing mind is
inadequate. Since whether conduct which threatens harm is criminal
depends on whether the actor could have chosen to do otherwise, his
state of mind may be important to the extent that it affects his ability
to exercise this choice. It may also be important because the actor's
purpose in acting affects his culpability in relation to the nature and
severity of the harm threatened by his act. But the view of mens rea
as state of mind which accompanies his act rather than as part of his
conduct itself is a source of confusion in orthodox theory.
An actor may deny criminal liability by asserting either that he
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was not responsible for his conduct or that it was not culpable. The
distinction between "responsibility' and 'culpability', as Gross uses
these words, is essential to an understanding of the framework of his
theory and the organization of the book. A person may be
responsible for conduct - eligible for blame - though it may be
determined that his conduct is not culpable or blameworthy. An
actor may successfully deny eligibility for blame by claims relating
to his conduct ("conduct-regarding" claims of exculpation), or to
himself ("actor-regarding" claims of exculpation) or to the interest
in which he acted ("interest-regarding" exculpatory claims). He is
not responsible if he did not act, if he did not do that with which he
is charged, if that with which he is charged is not an act, if the harm
which is essential to his liability was not caused by his act, or if his
act was involuntary or not really an act at all. Nor is he responsible
if he was unable to do other than as he did on account of mental
abnormality, infancy, compulsion, justifiable ignorance, entrapment, provocation, or if it was not possible to comply with the law.
The actor may deny culpability for some of the same reasons he
denies responsibility, but here the claim focusses on the criteria for
culpability mentioned earlier. There may be no intentional conduct,
or the conduct may not be sufficiently dangerous to meet the
requirements established by the law for the crime charged either
because it did not threaten harm of concern to the law or that harm
was not foreseeable. Alternatively, the accused may raise an
interest-regarding claim which asserts the legitimacy of what was
done though all other requirements of culpability are present. If the
interest which is served by doing harm is recognized within the law
of justification, the actor may have a defence.
This is the general framework in which Professor Gross examines
in detail conduct-regarding and actor-regarding exculpatory claims.
In Chapter 6 he considers conduct-regarding claims focussing on the
problems of attempts and causation. He takes issue with orthodox
analyses of attempt problems which distinguish the actor's conduct
on the basis of preparation, attempt and consummation. He also
rejects the traditional dichotomy of legal impossibility and factual
impossibility. Gross asks: Was a true threat of harm posed by the
actor's conduct? If his conduct was unambiguous, if his
commitment was not in doubt and if he puts himself in a position to
inflict the harm which the offence is concerned with, he may
properly be held liable. But the harm must be threatened, which it is
not if there is no harm-threatening conduct, as is the case in most
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legal-impossibility situations, or if the actor does not have reason to
believe that the harm he intends will occur, which may be the case
in some factual-impossibility situations.
In a masterful analysis of causation, Professor Gross distinguishes between an explanatory theory of causation which seeks to
validly account for cause-effect relationships, and a liability theory
of causation which explains the cause of harm which is of concern
to the criminal law. Liability theory requires that the explanatory
theory be satisfied only in the sense "that it is not the case that no
act of the accused was the cause (in an explanatory sense) of the
harm" (p. 239). Once satisfied, we can safely determine cause on
the basis of considerations peculiar to a theory of criminal liability
which assesses harm which the accused's conduct produces. If the
harm which occurred was not foreseeable, or if the expectation of
the harm is slight, the accused may successfully challenge the
allegation that his act was a cause of the harm. Professor Gross
emphasizes as well that criminal liability is concerned wtih the
accused's conduct as 'a' cause of the harm rather than 'the' cause.
Whereas in explanatory accounts, "we will choose as the cause the
element that best instructs us as to how that harm might have been
avoided" (p. 245), a liability theory will not countenance the
disqualification of an act which qualifies as a cause by another act,
perhaps more important in explanatory theory, which also qualifies
as a cause.
Professor Gross next discusses actor-regarding exculpationignorance, mistake, compulsion and mental abnormality. These are
true excuses which are properly recognized by the criminal law
though there are limits to the excuses which can be recognized. That
they are properly recognized, in Gross's view, is apparent in his
discussion of the contrasting views of H. L. A. Hart and Lady
Wootton. That there are limits to the excuses which can be made is
apparent in his arguments in Chapter 8 in response to "persistent
themes" raised by critics of criminal liability. To the critic who
points to conditioning influences beyond an accused's control which
made him act as he did, Gross answers, "to be responsible for one's
conduct it is not necessary that one be responsible for those things
without whose influence one would not have acted as he did. It is
necessary only that one be able to frustrate their effect" (p. 322). To
the determinist who asserts that the criminal is thoroughly subject to
nature's influences, Gross replies, "it is not the case that, whenever
a person could not do otherwise, he is not responsible for what he
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did. . . In order not to be responsible, the actor must have acted as
he did because he could not do otherwise" (p. 325). The distinction
here is valid if criminal justice is viewed as social criticism of an
offender. A person may be appropriately critized for doing as he did
even though he could not do otherwise, perhaps because he may
have wanted to do it regardless. As an answer to the determinist
who would deny criminal liability because there is no choice in fact,
it is wanting. Gross's reply to the less rigorous determinist who
would pardon criminal behaviour once he understands its causes is
more convincing. He argues that condemnation is compatible with
understanding: "for criminal liability it is the culpable character of
conduct that matters, and not the attitude which may be expected in
the light of what is or may be understood" (p. 328).
There follows Professor Gross's discussion of the justification of
punishment as an appropriate response to criminal liability.
Punishment is justified if it is useful; i.e., if it accomplishes a
necessary goal, and if it is needed; i.e. if there is no better way of
accomplishing the same goal. Common theories do not satisfy one
or both of these requirements and so fail to justify punishment. The
theory that punishment is necessary to remove dangerous persons
from society fails on both counts: punishment for this purpose is
useless because the common method of punishment, imprisonment,
breeds dangerous conduct, and it is needless because dangerous
persons are not readily identified by a process which determines
criminal liability. Rehabilitation theory fails because punishment
does not rehabilitate and because many who are subject to
punishment do not need rehabilitation because they are not
dangerous. The theory that a lawbreaker, in undergoing punishment, pays a debt to society is inadequate because criminal penalties
restore neither to society nor to a victim the loss which has been
suffered, nor do they discharge the lawbreaker from an obligation
which he has incurred. Deterrence theories which emphasize
intimidation and persuasion do not suffice as general theories
because no distinction is made between instances in which
intimidation might work and those in which it would not and there is
no relationship between the degrees of temptation associated with
particular crimes and severity of punishment. Moreover, when the
threat of intimidation becomes a reality, punishment fails to deter.
Gross prefers the theory that punishment is justified where it is
necessary to ensure that "the law is to remain a sufficiently strong
influence to keep the community on the whole law-abiding and so to
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make possible a peacable society" (p. 401). This too is a deterrence
theory but one in which criminal penalties maintain the rules as
standards compelling allegiance and not just as guidelines to which
conduct should conform. To state the theory is not to justify the
punishment. This theory too must meet the tests of usefulness and
need which it does, in Gross's view, because in the absence of
punishment, the influence of law (if it could then be called law)
would be insufficient to keep some or many law-abiding people
law-abiding.
Gross emphasizes that it is justification of punishment as it is
practiced with which he is concered. However, his critique of
common theories of punishment is valid only because current
penalties are not based on a rational scheme which reflects a
particular theory. Criminal penalties represent a legislative reaction
to the prohibited conduct which combines, willy nilly, ideas or
assumptions rooted in several or all theories of punishment. Gross's
justification of punishment is a theory which justifies punishment
only in principle because its usefulness and need cannot be
demonstrated other than by reference to assumptions about human
nature - perhaps very reliable assumptions, but assumptions
nonetheless. However, this theory is important because of his
emphasis on the relationship between liability and culpability. An
offender deserves punishment for liability based on culpability, and
such punishment may be necessary to keep the rules effective.
Greater punishment than that which is deserved is never necessary
for this purpose though less punishment may suffice. For example,
even if capital punishment is deserved for a crime (which Gross
does not concede) we may still condemn the crime sufficiently by
less severe punishment. Indeed the principle of mitigation compels
us to do so.
Professor Gross asserts that legislators and courts indulge
regularly in excessive punishment and he urges rejection of appeals
for disproportionate uniformity (the punishment of all serious
crimes by uniformly drastic measures). And we should as well
overcome the inequitable disparity of sentences which is rooted in
judical notions about punishment (as distinct from theories of
punishment) and aggravated by unevenness in the quality of legal
representation. He appeals for a uniform set of sentencing standards
which would structure the exercise of discretion to ensure that it
conformed to principles of criminal justice and which would more
readily facilitate appeals of sentences.
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It has been possible in these pages only to offer a general outline
of what this reviewer considers to be the essentials of Professor
Gross's theory of criminal justice. A study of this theory requires
great care with close attention to the excellent examples provided by
the author. The reader may conclude, as I have done, that this is one
of the two or three most important books on Anglo-American
criminal law to be published in recent years. It is of great interest
not only to scholars who have worked for years in this field, but also
to the novice who seeks to discover the principles of criminal
liability in statutes and case law. By providing a masterful account
of these principles, Professor Gross offers a sound basis upon which
the criminal law can be criticized, evaluated and reformed.
Peter MacKinnon
College of Law
University of Saskatchewan

Canadian Income Taxation. By Edwin C. Harris. Toronto:
Butterworths, 1979. Pp. xxiv, 840. Price: $32.50 (cloth), $25.00
(paper).
Almost inevitably, the student of income taxation begins with the
belief that he is taking on a hopeless task. The sheer size of the
Income Tax Act, a statute that with regulations and application rules
now fills twelve hundred pages in one commercial edition, perhaps
is explanation enough of his sense of frustration. But he soon comes
to appreciate that competent advice must also take account of
published statements of administrative policy (currently over six
hundred in number in various forms) and of an ever growing body
of tax jurisprudence. Once it has been pointed out that significant
amendments to the Act can be expected annually, the student's
despairing reaction may indeed appear justified.
One pragmatic response to the problem of complexity is
specialization. While no Canadian law faculty has yet attempted to
match the more than twenty taxation offerings of New York
University, the subject is routinely broken into a number of discrete
courses. Each of these concentrates upon a particular portion of the
whole capital gains tax, taxation of corporations and
shareholders, income tax policy and inter vivos and testamentary
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planning are common titles. Further, the student or practitioner
seeking guidance on a specific tax issue can choose from an
impressive array of sources, including the very useful papers and
journal articles published by the Canadian Tax Foundation and five
looseleaf services which attempt to provide up to date commentary
on the legislation and case law.
To those with the time to undertake the necessary studies or the
background required to use a tax library effectively, this sort of
specialization does make excellent sense. But unfortunately it may
do more to intimidate the generalist than to make the scheme of
Canadian income tax legislation accessible and comprehensible to
him. What the occasional traveller to the strange land of tax law
needs first is a reliable guidebook, not a series of detailed
topographic maps.
For these reasons, it is a pleasure to welcome the publication of
Professor Harris's excellent book, which he describes as "an
introductory (but not elementary) treatise on Canadian income
taxation" (page v.). As the report of the Symons commission'
reminded us not long ago, the shortage of integrative studies
covering basic subjects can be regarded as one of the principal
failings of Canadian legal scholarship. Since the author who seeks
to keep abreast of a constantly changing and expanding subject
condemns himself to the fate of Sisyphus, this general pattern is
understandably repeated in the field of income taxation. 2 While
Professor Harris points out in the preface that his book is designed
primarily for students of accounting and business rather than as a
legal treatise, it offers a good deal to the legally trained reader as
well.
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines a "treatise" as a
"book or writing . . . containing a methodical discussion or
exposition of the subject". 3 In both its scope and style, Professor
Harris's work conforms to this definition; its seventeen chapters
provide a clear and systematic review of the major structural
components of the Income Tax Act. Further, more than
twenty-seven hundred footnotes supplement the text with references
1. T. H. Symons, To Know Ourselves: The Report of the Commission on
CanadianStudies. 4 vols. (1975).
2. One excellent general work, prepared for use by the Law Society of Upper
Canada, is A.R.A. Scace, The Income Tax Law of Canada (4th ed; 1979). It is

interesting to note that the present edition lists seven contributors, in addition to the

principal author.

3. Vol. II. (1973), p. 2354.
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to case law, regulations and administrative statements as well as a
sampling of detailed papers written on particular subjects.
Throughout the book Professor Harris has employed a tripartite
organizational structure. An introduction to the subject under
consideration precedes a statement of the relevant principles or
basic rules; a final section provides a detailed elaboration of
material of more specialized interest. This format is especially
useful for the general reader, and for the most part it is utilized very
effectively. The author's treatment of eligible capital property (pp.
190-98) is an excellent example.
The book's treatment of the complex statutory provisions
governing corporations and shareholders might benefit, however,
from an expansion of the existing "overview" material. Chapter 14
(the book's longest and one of the most useful to the practitioner)
moves directly from the classification of corporations to a quite
detailed consideration of tax rates and credits. Only later in the
Chapter are some of the basic policy considerations which have
shaped these provisions dealt with at any length. Thus the principle
of neutrality (as implemented through the "integration"
mechanism) is treated under the heading of taxable dividends sixty
pages into the chapter. Indeed the fundamental rule that income
earned by a corporation is subject to tax at two levels appears over
forty pages from its start (at p. 613). While the entire book is
extensively cross-referenced, a lengthier introduction covering
basic principles would assist the reader to orient himself.
Certainly one of the most frustrating and intimidating features of
the Income Tax Act is the mathematically inspired "newspeak"
which has increasingly been used by its draftsmen. 4 Professor
Harris provides a great service by explaining succinctly and lucidly
some of the Act's most complex language. From this detailed
examination of selected sections the reader can obtain not only
useful substantive information but, more important, the confidence
and ability to interpret other similarly drafted provisions himself.
As Professor Harris's book is intended to be used for teaching
purposes (and accordingly includes extensive illustrations and
discussion questions), it seems appropriate to conclude by
commenting on it from a pedagogical perspective.
An instructor of income tax can choose from a wide variety of
4. For an informative and entertaining exchange on the question of how the Act
came to read this way see "Tax Simplification" in Proceedings27th Tax Conf. 7
(Can. Tax Foundation, 1975)
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teaching methods. Some use extensive analysis of case law to
develop rules of statutory interpretation and the ability to predict the
course of future decisions. For similar reasons, many rely heavily
upon problem solving. Still others prefer to emphasize the resource
allocation decisions and policy preferences which now seem all
pervasive in legislation originally intended for revenue raising
purposes alone. Presumably all teachers in professional faculties
must take account of the shared academic backgrounds and probable
career paths of their students.
Professor Harris's principal aim is to give the reader a grasp of
the basic structure of Canada's income tax legislation. Because of
this, the book is both a useful reference work and an excellent base
for further, more specialized study. A seeming emphasis upon the
statute at the expense of case law and broad policy analysis could be
ascribed to the needs of the book's business and accounting
audience. But the legally trained reader should perhaps bear in mind
the words of Dean Griswold of Harvard Law School:
Here [through the study of income tax] is an opportunity, almost
unique. . ., to study a complete and self-contained system. Here
is an opportunity to come into contact with perhaps our most
experienced administrative agency. Here is an opportunity to deal
with a statute, not as some excrescence of the common law, but
as the law, to trace its growth, to learn how it is given meaning
and how that meaning changes. Here is an opportunity to deal
with authoritative judicial decisions - or at least, and perhaps
more important, to consider how far they are authoritative. ...
Here as elsewhere it is understanding and knowledge of the
process that is sought. 5
James Ellis
Faculty of Law
University of Victoria
5. E. N. Griswold and M. J. Graetz, eds. Federal Income Taxation: Principles
and Policies (1976), p.xvi citing the preface to Grisivold's Cases on Federal
Taxation (Ist ed; 1940.)
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